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Available online 20 June 2005We agree with the point that Dr. Koppel and co-
authors make in their JAMA paper ‘‘The Role of
Computerized Physician Order Entry Systems in Facil-
itating Medication Errors.’’ There really is a problem
with healthcare IT and the problem is not an artifact
of the particular system that the papers research cov-
ered. It is intriguing that this is considered news.
Heeks et al. [1] have contended that ‘‘many—even
most—health care information systems are failures.’’
Moll van Charante et al. [2] pointed out similar issues
12 years ago. The research that our lab has conducted
over the past decade indicates that this is the way
healthcare IT systems work. With no changes to
how IT systems are developed, this is the way they
will continue to work in the future. That a problem
exists is not an issue. What the problem is and why
it exists beg more discussion.
Safety culture attitude surveys are currently popular,
but produce only shifting sands that oﬀer little traction
when it comes to making progress in patient safety.
The Koppel et al. article oﬀers a ﬁrm foothold. But
where do we take the next step? The problem is not ‘‘hu-
man error.’’ If it exists, error is a consequence of interac-
tion with IT systems rather than a cause of adverse
outcomes [3]. The core issue is to understand healthcare
work and workers. On the surface, healthcare work
seems to ﬂow smoothly. That is because the clinicians
who provide healthcare service make it so. Just beneath
the apparently smooth-running operations is a complex,
poorly bounded, conﬂicted, highly variable, uncertain,
and high-tempo work domain. The technical work [4]
that clinicians perform resolves these complex and con-
ﬂicting elements into a productive work domain. Occa-1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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that clinicians have created and remain unaware of the
conﬂicts that lie beneath it. The technical work that cli-
nicians perform is hiding in plain sight. Those who know
how to do research in this domain can see through the
smooth surface and understand its complex and chal-
lenging reality. Occasional visitors cannot fathom this
demanding work, much less create IT systems to sup-
port it.
Progress in healthcare IT systems relies on scientiﬁc
data on the actual, not the perceived, nature of day-to-
day operations. These data are produced by research
activities that are unfamiliar to the ﬁeld of healthcare.
Cognitive engineering methods [5] such as cognitive task
analysis can be used in conjunction with observation to
map the distributed cognition processes that are related
to daily work activity. Research professionals who per-
form this type of work describe the use of methods that
include observation, artifact analysis, workplace studies,
schemata analysis, and mental model analysis to under-
stand practitioner cognition at the sharp (operator) end
[6]. Insights that ﬂow from these messy, but essential,
details will guide new IT development in ways that move
beyond presumptive fantasies over the potential beneﬁts
of technology, and surprise over its unforeseen circum-
stances [7]. These and related methods, which have been
developed over 20 years by the social sciences, oﬀer
healthcare and IT a way out of the failure that Koppel
and his colleagues describe.
The workers that Koppel et al. studied recognize that
their CPOE system is not a team player [8]. This kind of
failure is not limited to clinical healthcare IT. IT has not
been a good team player in other work sectors either, de-
spite enormous investments of time and eﬀort. Klein et
al. [9] contend that any participants in joint activity,
including automation components, must:
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intend to work together.
Be mutually predictable—Enable others to know
what to expect through shared knowledge and idi-
osyncratic coordination based on long experience
or by substituting explicit procedures and
expectations.
Be mutually directable—Able to deliberately assess
and modify others actions as conditions and priori-
ties change and respond to the inﬂuence of others
as activities unfold.
Maintain common ground—Take action to preserve
the pertinent knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions
that involved parties share.
With no understanding of the healthcare team or its
work, IT cannot ﬁll any of these requirements. Until
they do, how should we view these new IT systems
that garner such enthusiasm? They are, in a word,
experiments. Healthcare IT systems that are developed
without a deep understanding of the healthcare work
domain can only reﬂect a guess of how such systems
should be conﬁgured. Koppel et al. remind us that
IT experiments such as the CPOE installation they
studied are not yet ready ‘‘for prime time’’ as opera-
tional systems. Authentic knowledge of healthcare
sharp end work and its workers, incorporated
throughout their development, will make it possible
to develop IT systems that perform as team players
[9]. The prudent healthcare manager will ensure that
this research is done before installing such a system,
or risk being the subject of a future study that de-scribes another multi-million dollar failure and contin-
ued threat to patient safety.References
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